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Abstract: 
This study develops and estimates a model of real estate agent demand and supply. The estimates 
of the model show that the licensing examination pass rate and the educational requirements set 
by state licensing boards affect the numbers and incomes of real estate agents. The study further 
shows that the demand for agents is related to economic activity in the housing market and that 
the supply of agents is very elastic with respect to agent earnings. 
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Article: 
1. Introduction 
State licensing is required widely in professions like real estate sales. Although the rationale for 
state licensing is consumer protection, a number of studies have linked occupational licensing to 
reduced competition and higher professional earnings (see, for example, Benham, Maurizi, and 
Reder, 1968; Friedman and Kuznets, 1945; Kleiner and Kudrle, 1997; and Rose, 1979). In the 
real estate field, however, the results reported by past studies have been inconsistent. Johnson 
and Loucks (1986) estimate a structural model of agent demand and supply. Based on the 
estimates of their model, they conclude that there is no support for the view that restricting the 
number of agents through licensing raises the average incomes of agents. Carroll and Gaston 
(1979) and Maurizi (1994), while not estimating complete structural models of the agent market, 
present correlations that suggest that licensing, indeed, does raise agent incomes. They find that 
licensing pass rates and agent incomes are negatively correlated, as would be expected if lower 
pass rates represent higher barriers to entry. 
 
This article reexamines the issue of state licensing and its effects on incomes. We draw on new 
estimates of agent earnings by metropolitan area (MSA), and we adjust nominal incomes for 
regional cost of living differentials using the American Chamber of Commerce Research 
Association (ACCRA) regional cost of living index. The first section of the article sets forth the 
theoretical model. Section 2 discusses the empirical data and its sources. Section 3 presents 
empirical results. The final section summarizes relevant findings. 
 
2. Licensing and the supply and demand for real estate agents 
At any point in time, a person contemplating a career in real estate sales can be expected to 
compare the expected utility of the earnings as a real estate agent U(ERE) to the expected utility 
of the earnings from the person's next best alternative U(E.). If there are no barriers to entry and, 
thus, it is costless to enter the real estate field, the individual would become a real estate agent if 
U(ERE) is greater than U(Ea). 
 
However, if a state licensing examination must be passed prior to becoming a real estate agent, 
the prospective agent must compare the present value of the expected gain in earnings utility 
over the individual's working time horizon with the cost (C0), both in time and capital, of 
acquiring the necessary knowledge to pass the state examination. The expected marginal benefit 
of becoming a real estate agent in period t is the probability of passing the exam, pe, multiplied 
by U(ERE) minus U(Ea), or pe U(ERE) — U(Ea). 
 
We assume that the individual will choose to become a real estate agent if the expected net 
present value NPVe of the investment in education and training necessary to pass the exam is 
positive—that is, if 
 
where r is the individual's time value of money, or cost of capital, and the individual's expected 
marginal benefits are expected to accrue from time period t = 1 through period t=n
1 
. 
 
An individual is indifferent to changing to a real estate career when NPVe = 0. By solving for the 
indifference probability when NPVe = 0, the decision to take the examination becomes clear: 
 
Equation (2) suggests that increases in earnings as a real estate agent lowers an individual's 
required probability of passing the exam, while an increase in the cost increases the required 
probability. Moreover, higher wages in alternative employment increase the required probability 
of passing. 
 
Suppose the pass rate is lowered, which has the effect of decreasing pe to increasing C0 to 
, and increasing The revised is as follows: 
 
By subtracting equation (3) from equation (1), the change in net present value attributable to a 
change in the pass rate is determined: 
 
where A lower pass rate results in and 
 The additional entry barrier also may raise earnings so that  In this case, 
the sign and magnitude of will be indeterminant. 
 
The indifference probability of passing is found by setting equation (4) equal to zero and solving 
for as follows: 
 
The new break-even NPV probability is determined by the original probability of passing, the 
present value of the utility of original earnings, the additional cost imposed by the new pass rate, 
and the present value of the utility of new earnings. In simple terms, for the net present value for 
an individual to remain unchanged, increases in the initial cost of taking the exam must be offset 
by a sufficient increase in earnings in the real estate field. If not, the new (lower) pass rate will 
lower the NPV, reducing the likelihood that an individual will decide to enter the profession. 
 
Past research has shown that pass rates on state licensing exams are negatively related to the 
number of complaints logged against real estate agents Shilling and Sirmans, (1988). Thus, 
higher complaint levels appear to lead to lower pass rates. This research suggests that state 
licensing boards use low pass rates to limit entry in order to raise the quality of service and 
protect consumers. Indeed, licensing boards may use low pass rates as a signal to potential 
entrants into the profession that substantial investment is necessary to acquire the knowledge 
necessary to pass the licensing exam. And, over time, lower pass rates can be expected to reduce 
the number of entrants into the profession, as the higher up-front investment costs reduce the 
payoff of becoming an agent. 
 
In addition to increasing the difficulty of their licensing exams, many licensing boards impose 
additional entry restrictions such as education and experience requirements. Such requirements 
also raise the cost of entry into the real estate profession, making it less likely that an individual 
will choose to enter the field. 
 
To explore the impact of licensing on the market for agents, we posit the following model of 
demand and supply for real estate agents: 
 
 
The model consists of two equations and eight variables. The number of agents per household 
(Ai) and average agent earnings (Ei) are endogenous; while the other variables are exogenous. 
Both the demand equation and the supply equation are overidentified. 
 
Prior research has looked extensively at the factors that influence the earnings of individual 
agents (see, for example, Glower and Hendershott, 1988; Crellin, Frew, and Jud, 1988; Sirmans 
and Swicegood, 1997; and Jud and Winkler, 1998). These studies have shown that earnings are 
influenced by human capital factors (education, experience, etc.) and aggregate market 
conditions (market size, income, etc). In our model of average earnings, or market demand, we 
assume the distribution of human capital factors constant and relate average earnings to the 
number of agents and market conditions. 
 
In the market demand, or earnings equation (6), the sign on A; is expected to be negative because 
greater numbers of agents per household, other things equal, is thought to result in smaller 
commissions or lower numbers of houses sold per agent. Demand, or the earnings of agents, is 
expected to rise with the number of households and household income because real estate agency 
service is thought to be a normal good. The sign on the interaction term is expected 
to be positive because agent demand is derived from the demand for housing services and, 
therefore, is positively related to housing market activity.2 
 
In the supply equation (7), the sign on agent earnings (Ei) is expected to be positive. Supply also 
is expected to be positively related to the pass rate (PRi). We assume that supply is responsive to 
the pass rate from a previous period. Because the pass rate is a signal to applicants of the level of 
study and effort required to pass the exam and their probability of passing, it is reasonable to 
assume that it takes time for the signal to be received and interpreted by potential applicants. The 
lagged value for the pass rate thus helps ensure that there is a one-way flow of causation in the 
supply equation (7).3 
 
Supply is expected to be negatively related to the level of licensing educational requirements 
(Ed;). Housing cost (HC;) is included because agents are likely to be attracted to higher-cost 
areas where commissions are likely to be larger. The number of households (Hi) is included as 
an additional exogenous variable that helps identify the supply function. 
 
3. Empirical data 
Empirical data to estimate the system of equations are available for 54 metropolitan areas. A 
listing of the specific MSAs included in the sample along with a table showing sample means 
and standard deviations is included in the Appendix. Data on the number of agents in each MSA 
were obtained from tabulations derived from the 1990 Census (Bureau of the Census, 1994). The 
data show the number of full-time equivalent workers in real estate sales as reported to the 
Census. The earnings variable in this study is derived from a vector of MSA dummy variable 
coefficients obtained from a real estate agent earnings equation estimated using Census data and 
reported previously by Jud and Winkler (1998).4 The earnings variable represents the relative 
level of average nominal earnings of real estate agents in the MSA, standardized for education, 
experience, gender, and full-time work. This measure of nominal earnings is deflated by the 
ACCRA regional cost of living index (1989) to adjust for regional differences in the cost of 
living. The housing cost variable (HCi) is the ACCRA regional housing cost index (1989). 
 
The lagged pass rate variable (PRi) and the data for the educational variable (EDi) are taken from 
the NARELLO (1988 and 1990) annual reports. All other data are obtained from the Woods and 
Poole regional data bank. Average household income (Inci) is deflated by the ACCRA regional 
cost of living index. 
 
The annual NORELLO reports reveal several ways to measure the stringency of state 
educational standards. Most states require a certain number of classroom hours to sit for the 
salesperson's exam. Additional classroom hours usually are required to take the broker's exam. 
After an agent is licensed, many states have begun to require continuing education hours prior to 
license renewal, which increase the cost and time necessary for an agent to remain licensed. We 
use the educational requirements reported in the NORELLO (1990) report. 
 
To avoid the collinearity problems of using these multiple education indexes, we create an 
aggregate measure of state educational requirements using principal components. In essence, this 
method reduces the number of educational variables to a smaller subset that contains most of the 
licensing information from the full set.5 Table 1 reports a factor analysis with principal 
components as the factor method. The eigenvalue of 1.4413 (the sum of the squared factor 
loadings) suggests a strong common principal component for the three indexes; these indexes are 
the educational requirements for brokers and salespersons prior to taking their respective 
examinations as well as continuing education requirements necessary for license renewal. The 
proportion of total variance explained by one factor is approximately 48 percent (the eigenvalue 
divided by the number of indexes). All subsequent principal components (not reported in Table 
1) have eigenvalues less than 1.0 and explain less than 1/p of the variation, where p denotes the 
number of original variables. Therefore, only the first principal component is reported in Table 1. 
The first column of Table 1 shows the coefficients for the principal components. Higher values 
of 
 
each index indicate higher educational requirements. The third column of Table 1 renders the 
scoring coefficients estimated by regression; the transformed data becomes the education 
variable for the regression analysis. 
 
4. Empirical results 
Table 2 shows the estimates of equations (6) and (7) obtained using two-stage least squares 
(TSLS). The equations were estimated using the White correction for heteroskedasticity-
consistent standard errors and covariances. All but one of the estimated coefficients (that is, the 
coefficient on the income variable in the demand equation) are statistically significant at the 0.05 
level using a two-tailed test. 
 
As expected, the sign on the number of agents (Ai) in the demand equation is negative and the 
sign on earnings (Ei) in the supply equation is positive. In the demand equation, the elasticity of 
agent earnings with respect to the number of agents, estimated at the means, is — 0.82, 
indicating that average earnings is inelastic with respect to increases in the number of agents. 
Demand is strongly related the level of economic activity in the housing market, as measured by 
the interaction term In the supply equation, the elasticity of the number of agents 
with respect to earnings is 1.98, showing that supply is very elastic with respect to changes in 
earnings. Supply also is positively related to housing cost (HCi), suggesting that agents are 
attracted to areas where commissions are likely to be higher. 
 
The pass-rate variable (PRi) in the supply equation is positive, which demonstrates that changes 
in the average pass rate exert a significant influence on the supply of agents. The elasticity of 
agent supply with respect to the examination pass rate is 0.60, inelastic with respect to the pass 
rate. The supply of agents is negatively related to the stringency of educational requirements. 
However, the estimated elasticity is small, indicating that supply is relatively unresponsive to 
changes in this variable. Using the model in Table 1 to simulate the effect of a 10 percent 
reduction in the examination pass rate, we find that average earnings increase 2.0 percent and 
quantity supplied falls — 2.7 percent. 
 
5. Conclusions and implications 
This study develops and estimates a model of real estate agent demand and supply. The estimates 
of the model show that licensing affects the number and average income of real estate agents.6 
The study also shows that the demand for agents is related to economic activity in the housing 
market. On the supply side, quantity supplied is found to be very elastic with respect to earnings. 
 
The results reported here differ in several important respects from those reported in past studies. 
First, in the demand equation, the number of agents is shown to exert a clear negative influence 
on average earnings, as would be expected with traditional theory. Second, the pass rate in the 
supply equation is shown to be positive, indicating that state licensing boards affect agent supply 
by their decisions involving examination pass rates. Educational requirements are found to have 
little influence on supply, and therefore, a small influence on earnings of real estate 
professionals. 
 
 
 
Notes 
1. If the costs in time and effort (C0) are expected to occur in years following period t = 0, 
equation (1) must be modified as follows: 
 
2. If available, it might be desirable to include a more direct measure of housing transactions or 
other measure of housing stock turnover. However, we have not been able to locate a 
consistent national source for the number of home sales and similar measures of sales activity 
on a metropolitan (MSA) basis. Our decision to use MSA data is based on the need to 
construct an earnings variable that controls for education, experience, full-time work, and cost 
of living differences. 
3. In this case, by using a lagged pass rate, it is expected that the lagged pass rate influences the 
number of real estate agent per 1,000 households; however, the opposite causation cannot 
occur. 
4. Jud and Winkler (1998) estimate the following equation: 
 
where LnY is the natural log of annual earnings, F/T is a dummy variable equal 1 (0 
otherwise) if employed full time, Female is a dummy variable equal 1 (0 otherwise) if female, 
Sch is the number of years of schooling, Exp is the number of years of general labor market 
experience, and Region is a vector of dummy variables representing the MSA of employment. 
 
Data to estimate the equation are obtained from the Bureau of the Census (1994). These data 
reflect the earnings of workers in 1989. The "Region" variable is an array of 98 MSA dummy 
variables that is included to hold constant earnings differences among major areas of the 
country. Standard F-tests reveal that the metro-effects array (Region) is statistically 
significant. The calculated F-ratio is 5.08. The estimated regional earnings coefficients show 
the effects of location on earnings, holding constant schooling, experience, gender, and part-
time work. 
5. Principle component analysis is used to explain the variance-covariance data structure through 
a lesser number of linear combinations of the original variables. The principal components 
replace the original variable (see Johnson and Wichern, 1982). 
6. We do not attempt to assess the full magnitude of the welfare loss to consumers that results 
from professional restrictions to entry. Because past research (Shilling and Sirmans, 1988; 
Guntermann and Smith, 1988) has shown that entry restrictions raise the level of service 
quality and reduce consumer complaints, a complete analysis of the welfare effects must 
balance service quality gains against the lessened supply and higher incomes reported here. 
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